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APPELLANT BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Pursuant to a plea agreement between Appellant Damon Comer and the State of Utah, 
Appellant Comer specifically reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. In the Judgment and 
Order on Plea Held in Abeyance dated March 30, 2001 by the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
paragraph 17 specifically states Appellant guilty plea was conditional, reserving the right to appeal. 
R. 118. (Attachment 1) 
In the minutes of the hearing held on March 27, 2001, the specifically states "Defendant 
reserves the right to appeal on the search issue." R110. (Attachment 2) 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I: Appellant Damon Comer Specifically Reserved his Right to Appeal in the 
Plea in Abeyance. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement between Appellant Damon Comer and the State of Utah, 
Appellant Comer specifically reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. In the Judgment and 
Order on Plea Held in Abeyance dated March 30, 2001 by the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
paragraph 17 specifically states Appellant guilty plea was conditional, reserving the right to appeal. 
R. 118. (Attachment 1) 
Further, in the minutes of the hearing held on March 27, 2001, the agreement specifically 
states 'Defendant reserves the right to appeal on the search issue." R 110. (Attachment 2) 
In State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1998) this Court held 
We hold that conditional pleas of the sort in issue here, when agreed to by the 
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defendant and the prosecution and approved by the trial court, are permissible in Utah 
even though they are not specifically authorized by the statutes governing the entry 
of pleas by criminal defendants. > (FN4) See > Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1988); 
> Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-13-2, -3, -6 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1988). 
Conditional plea agreements were accepted by the state courts in Oveson, Ashby, 
Crosby, and Reid, cited above, despite the absence in those jurisdictions of any 
authorizing court rule or statute. They were also accepted by two federal circuits 
long before the 1983 adoption of > Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), which for the first time 
affirmatively authorized conditional pleas of guilty or nolo contendere that preserved 
a federal defendant's right to appellate review of adverse pre-trial rulings, including 
those on fourth amendment issues. > See United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 
(3d Cir.1978); > United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1975) (pre-trial 
motion to suppress). > (FN5) More recently, the defendant in > United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), had pleaded 
guilty but expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 
The United States Supreme Court tacitly approved of that conditional plea practice, 
notwithstanding the lack of any authorizing statute or rule, by addressing the merits 
of the fourth amendment issue and affirming the Second Circuit's reversal of the trial 
court's denial of defendant Place's motion to suppress. 
758 P.2d 935, State v. Sery, (Utah App. 1988) 
„ Excerpt from pages 758 P.2d 939-758 P.2d 940 
In the present action, Appellant specifically reserved his right to appeal through the plea in 
abeyance. It was part of the agreement and part of the contractual bargain entered into by Appellant. 
Further, the Trial Court fully approved and signed the order allowing the plea in abeyance 
with the preservation of the appeal. 
ISSUE II Appellants should have been allowed to use the Preliminary Hearing 
Tape at the Suppression Hearing 
Officer Dickey testified he briefly scanned the room when he entered the residence. Counsel 
requested to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing as it evidenced Officer Dickey's 
testimony was inconsistent with earlier testimony. R. 126 P 9. 
At the Suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows: 
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Q. Tell me what you mean when you briefly scan the room? Do you look 
everywhere at everything in the room? 
A. No. 
Q. You look all around the room? What do you briefly scan for? 
A. I briefly scan to see if there's a shotgun laying on the table. 
Q. I see. So, based on this scan you just testified you did, you would 
have noticed a shotgun on the table or a person sitting in a chair with 
a gun. Did you notice if there was any furniture knocked over? 
Q. Would you have noticed if there was any holes in the walls? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. Now, I'm going to ask you whether or not you remember 
testifying at the preliminary hearing in this matter? 
A. Briefly. 
Q. Well, do you remember if you testimony would be the same as it was 
today, if you're telling the truth. 
A. Yes, it would be. R 126 P. 10 
During the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows: 
Q. When you got inside the home there was nothing inside the home to 
indicate that there'd been any violence inside the home, correct? 
A. My focus was on Ms. Comer. I didn't have time to can the living area 
of the home. 
Q. If there'd been something out of place, a broken table, a hole in the 
wall, something like that, that would have caught your attention and 
raised your level of officer safety, correct? 
A. My concern was with Ms. Comer at that time. She's my initial threat? 
R 127 P. 13 
After the above testimony, and at the end of the hearing, Counsel for Appellant stated that 
Appellants wished to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing to verify Officer Dickey had 
made an inconsistent statement from the prior testimony at the preliminary hearing. The Court 
declined to hear this evidence and stated that was not the critical issue. R 126 P. 31-32. 
Although not a major point in the present appeal, Appellants argue the Court did not afford 
a fair hearing on the motion to suppress by not allowing Appellants to use the video tape of the 
preliminary hearing to cross-examine the witness. Appellants attempted to show the Officer Dickey's 
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testimony was inconsistent from his testimony at the preliminary hearing. 
The purpose of exploring the inconsistent statements of Officer Dickey and Detective Vincent 
was to show the officers were attempting to posture their case as the issues become apparent. 
For instance, there was a big issue about what took place at the door of the residence, 
specifically whether Ms. Comer came outside and closed the door or whether she peeked out from 
inside. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified Ms. Comer immediately shut the door 
behind her. R. 127 P. 11. At the suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified Ms. Comer opened 
the door and peeked around. R 126 P. 7. Officer Vincent testified Ms. Comer pulled the door pretty 
much closed. R. 127 P. 27. 
Further, there was an issue about whether Officer Dickey scanned the room for weapons or 
did not scan the room. As noted in the facts above, Officer Dickey stated at the preliminary hearing 
he did not scan the room because his focus was on Ms. Comer. As the suppression hearing, when 
the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to enter the home, Officer Dickey suddenly 
becomes more concerned about his safety and how much of a threat there really was. There is 
sufficient evidence to show Officer Dickey is attempting to add facts and change his story to posture 
the case. 
Also, the Court found that Ms. Comer's 'unexplained' re-entry into the home gave the 
officers probable cause to believe an emergency existed. However, this testimony is in contradiction 
between the two hearings. 
First, at the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows: 
Q. When you got there you knocked on the front door and Mrs. Comer 
answered the door, is that right? 
A. Yes, she did. 
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Q. And then what happened? 
A. At that point I asked Ms. Comer if anyone else was in the house. I 
conversed with her briefly as to why I was there. At that time she 
stated that her husband was also in the house. 
Q. And did she go back into the house to get him. 
A. Yes, she did. R 127 P. 4 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows: 
Q. And then as you question her about the -- you told her why you were 
there. As you question her about other people in the home, as I 
understand your testimony you didn't say can we talk to your husband. 
She just turned around and headed back into the house? 
A. Correct. R. 126 P. 7 
Finally, at the preliminary hearing Detective Vincent testified as follows: 
A. Officer Dickey knocked on the door. Ms. Comer came to the door. 
Again, when she came out, she came outside the door and then just 
kind of pulled the door closed. We visited at that point. I don't recall 
a lot of what was said. I recall Officer Dickey asking if there was 
anybody else in the home. She stated that her husband was there. I 
believe that he indicated that we would need to talk to him as well. 
R. 127 P. 27 
Officer Dickey's testimony at the suppression hearing about Ms. Comer's reaction at the 
door, and what questions were asked to her, is in direct contradiction to his own testimony at the 
preliminary hearing as well as Detective Vincent's testimony. 
Again, Appellants sought to explore the inconsistent testimony to further support the 
argument the officers were posturing the case as the issues became apparent. This is incredibly 
important based on the fact the Trial Court found an emergency existed because of Ms. Comer's 
unexplained retreat into the home. R. 126 P. 40 
Further, credibility is always an issue during testimony of witnesses. In essence, the only 
evidence the trial court has is the testimony of witnesses. If there is evidence a witness is testifying 
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inconsistently, it may call into question the witnesses' entire testimony. The trial court should have 
allowed Appellants to present evidence to challenge the veracity of the witnesses statements. 
ISSUE HI: Exigent Circumstances did not Exist Justifying the Officers' 
Warrantless Entry into the Home 
The emergency aid doctrine requires three criteria to be met prior to finding a justified 
warrantless entry into a home. 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 
exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of 
life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize 
evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area 
or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be 
searched and the emergency. 
Salt Lake Citv v. Davidson. 994 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Utah App. 2000). 
Contrary to Appellee's brief, the State of Utah has been unable to prove the first prong of the 
emergency circumstances exception. 
The first prong requires the officers to have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life. 
The first officer to testify at the suppression hearing was officer Dickey. There were basically 
three instances when officer Dickey testified regarding the first prong of the emergency circumstances 
doctrine. 
Officer Dickey first stated 
Q. When Ms. Comer comes to the door and doesn't open it completely, does that indicate 
anything to you? 
A. Umm, it appeared to me, being - obviously she knows who we are. Police officers 
in full uniform. It appeared odd to me that she would just open the door to peek 
around and speak with us. I appeared to me that she may have been trying to — I 
don't know, either conceal something of just prevent us from seeing inside the 
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residence. R. 126 p.7 
Officer Dickey stated second 
Q. Did that raise any concerns of yours? 
A. If just appeared odd that, you know, I didn't request for her to go get her husband. 
She just automatically turned to go get him of to get away from speaking with me. 
R. 126 p. 8 
Officer Dickey stated finally 
Q. So let me ask you, at that time did you believe that there was an emergency that you 
needed to immediately respond to? 
A. I didn't know one way or the other. Just the report that I had was all the information 
I had. R 126 p. 20 
Next, Officer Vincent testified about the first prong of the emergency circumstances doctrine. 
Officer Vincent first testified. 
A. There was some conversation as to what had gone on as far as a family fight situation. 
She was asked if there was anyone else in the house. Ms. Comer indicated that her 
husband was in there. And then she went back in the house to get him. R. 126 p. 22 
Second, Officer Vincent testified as follows 
Q. All right. Can you point to anything — when you arrived at that residence can you 
point to anything that would have led to you believe that an emergency situation 
existed? 
A. No. Just the fact that we received the call indicating that there was some kind of 
altercation there. R. 126 p. 24 
Third, Officer Vincent testified as follows: 
Q. All right. Was there ever a time during the entire thing, from the time dispatch called 
to the time you finished this investigation, that there was ever an emergency situation 
requiring immediate assistance for the protection of anybody's life. 
A. Probably not that was life threatening. You know, obviously, in a family fight I think 
things can escalate to that, but that's hard for me to say. I don't know what may have 
happened had we not gotten there. That I don't know. R 126 p, 26 
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In Appellee's brief, Appellee cites State v. Lynd P.2d 770, 773 (Wash. App. 1989) where the 
Washington Appellate Court stated 
Whether a police officer acts in the face of a perceived emergency were 
objectively reasonable is a matter to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it 
reasonably appeared to the officer at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar after 
the event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis. 
In the present action, through all the testimony of both oSlcers as stated above, there was not 
one indication of what the objective reasonable basis supporting the suspicion of the emergency was. 
The nearest either officer got to an objective reasonable belief there was an emergency was in the 
testimony that sometimes family fights involve injured victims, sometimes, not all the time. Both 
officers merely pointed to generalities about domestic violence calls. 
The Appellee is right on point in stating the determination of an objective reasonable belief 
should be evaluated from the officers in the situation and not by scholars months after. In the present 
action, the Appellee, as the trial court did, is doing just that. 
Appellee's brief is filled with generalities about domestic violence and the nature of those 
types of calls. What is missing in these facts regarding the first prong of the emergency circumstances 
doctrine is the objective reasonable basis, from testimony by the officers in this action, that an 
emergency existed and there needed to be immediate action for the protection of life. 
Finally, there is ample evidence Officer Dickey changed his story several times in order to give 
more credibility to the perceived emergency after the memorandums had been filed and the issues 
were apparent. In section two of this brief, regarding the preliminary hearing transcript, there are 
several instances of inconsistent testimony. One of the most important is the testimony regarding 
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Appellant Misty Comer's re-entry into the home. The Trial Court found this to be a significant fact 
when the Court ruled 
In this case the court finds that the requirements have been met for the 
following reason. The defendant, Misty Comer, according to the testimony, made a 
somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the house. In other words, without 
saying why. And during the middle of a conversation 
with the officers she heads back into the house. R. 126 P. 40. 
Based upon an examination of the two hearings, it is clear Ms. Comer was asked to go back 
inside and get her husband, and there was nothing unusual or unexplained about this re-entry. Officer 
Dickey states as such at the preliminary hearing. R. 127 P. 4. Further, Officer Vincent verifies the 
fact Ms. Comer was asked to go back inside to get her husband. R. 127 P. 27 
After reviewing the testimony from both of the hearings in this matter, it is clear the only way 
the Trial Court could find there was a reasonable belief an emergency existed was to conclude that 
there is a reasonable belief of an emergency every time there is a report of a family fight. Report of 
a family fight is simply not sufficient basis to enter a person's home without a warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments, the trial court erred in denying Appellants' motion to 
suppress. Emergency circumstances did not exist which would allow a warrantless entry into 
Appellants' residence. 
Respectfully submitted this [^\ day of October, 2001. 
Request for Oral Argument 
BOND 
Attoniey for Appellknt 
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I hereby certify I mailed a two true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief to the following: 
Jeffery S. Gray 
Attorney General's Office 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor 
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DATED this / / day of October, 2001. 
STIN C. BOND 
Attorney at Law 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
11 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DAMON COMER, 
Plaintiff, j 
Defendant. 
' C" " ' ' 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER V 
: ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE ^ 
> < 
: Case No. 001100432 
cr> 
Defendant appeared in open court, with his attorney, Justin 
C. Bond, on the 27th day of March 2001, with the State being 
represented by Jon J. Bunderson, and the defendant having 
previously entered into a Plea in Abeyance Agreement which was 
accepted and approved by the Court, and the parties having 
previously moved for the Court to accept defendant's Plea in 
Abeyance, which Motion the Court granted, and the defendant 
having entered his plea of guilty, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the crime 
or crimes of: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A 2ND DEGREE 
FELONY 
2. The Court has accepted defendant's plea, and has found 
the same to be given voluntarily and knowingly, and the plea 
shall be held in abeyance pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
this Order. 
3. The defendant is hereby placed under the supervision of 
the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Utah Department of 
Corrections, and is ordered to comply with the terms and 
conditions hereof as if the defendant were on probation. 
4. The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the 
Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and comply 
strictly with its terms and conditions, including any search and 
seizure waivers contained therein. 
5. The defendant shall report to the Department and to the 
Court whenever required. 
6. The defendant shall violate no law, either Federal, 
State, or Municipal. 
7. Upon successful completion of the terms and conditions 
of the Plea in Abeyance and this Order, the charge shall be 
reduced to a conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE, A CLASS MA,f MISDEMEANOR. 
8. Restitution is ordered as follows: NONE ORDERED 
9. Defendant shall pay an administrative fee of $200. 
10. Defendant shall serve two weekends in the Box Elder 
County Jail, starting March 30, 2001. 
11. Defendant shall obtain an identification card in a form 
prescribed by Adult Probation and Parole and carry it at all 
times, and display the same to any law enforcement officer with 
whom the defendant comes into contact in the officer's official 
capacity. 
2 
12. Defendant shall display an anti-drug bumper sticker on 
any vehicle defendant drives; if ordered by Adult Probation and 
Parole, defendant shall also display an anti-drug bumper sticker 
at defendant's home in the location ordered by Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
13. Defendant shall not consume or possess alcohol or 
illegal drugs, or associate with anyone who uses illegal drugs or 
is consuming alcohol, nor shall defendant be present in any place 
where alcohol is the main item served on the menu or where 
controlled substances are being used. 
14. Defendant shall obtain any evaluation required by Adult 
Probation and Parole or the Court, and defendant shall enter 
into, successfully complete, and pay for any counseling or 
program ordered by Adult Probation and Parole, through a provider 
approved by Adult Probation and Parole, and successfully complete 
all required aftercare. 
15. Defendant's person, property, breath, and bodily fluids 
shall be subject to random search and seizure during the term of 
his probation by all law enforcement personnel, to determine his 
compliance with terms of probation. 
16. Defendant shall pay Box Elder County the sum of $250 as 
compensation for the public defender. 
17. Defendant's guilty plea was conditional, reserving the 
right to appeal. 
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The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and 
further Orders as it may deem necessary from time to time, and, 
further, retains jurisdiction to terminate the terms and 
conditions hereof and enter defendant's plea of guilty. The 
Court further retains jurisdiction to sentence the defendant, 
either at such time as this Order is terminated, or at such time 
as the defendant successfully completes the terms and conditions 
hereof. 
DATED this ^° day of rlorcL 2001. 
ATTEST: 
JOE DERRING, COURT CLERK 
)eputy Clerk 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE to 
defendant's attorney, Justin C. Bond, P. O. Box 895, Brigham 
City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid, this ^ M day of 
mr\M-,W 2001 , \L& A. 
Secretary 
•\ \ , V KkXO-rM-i 
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FIRST DISTRICT - Box Elder COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAMON REX COMER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001100432 FS 
Judge: BEN HADFIELD 
Date: March 27, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shaunaw 
Prosecutor: BUNDERSON, JON J. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BOND, JUSTIN C 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 16, 1975 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:02 AM 
CHARGES 
1. POSS/DIST C/S W/IN 1000' OF SCHL/PBLIC P - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/06/2001 Plea in abeyance 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Defendant's plea is held in abeyance. 
DIVERSION ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
PAY A PLEA IN ABEYANCE FEE OF $200 
SERVE 2 WEEKENDS IN JAIL FROM 6 PM FRIDAY TO 6 PM SUNDAY 
OBTAIN AND CARRY A PROBATION I.D. CARD 
DISPLAY AN ANTI-DRUG BUMPER STICKER ON ON VEHICLE OR IN FRONT 
WINDOW OF RESIDENCE 
DO NOT POSSESS OR CONSUME ALCOHOL OR ILLEGAL DRUGS OR FREQUENT ANY 
PLACES WHERE ALCHOL IS THE CHIEF ITEM OF SALE 
Page 1 
Case No: 001100432 
Date: Mar 27, 2001 
SUBMIT TO RANDOM SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CHEMICAL TESTING 
SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAM AND 
AFTERCARE AND PAY THE COSTS 
PAY A PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE IN THE AMOUNT OF $250. 
POSSESS NO WEAPONS DURING PERIOD OF SUPERVISION 
In addition to the fine, the defendant is ordered to pay 200.00 for 
PLEA IN ABEY FELONY. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
DEF RESERVES THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ON THE SEARCH ISSUE. 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
BEN HADFIELD 
District Court Judge 
